In Search of Solutions for IAF’s Dwindling Assets

Continuing where I left my previous post ‘Evaporating clouds for Defence Indigenisation’. . let me take up the problem of IAF’s dwindling combat assets. Strategic thinkers have been discussing and debating this issue for over two decades. Yet, there has not been any improvement in the situation because, despite good intentions,  actions by the establishment have not been well directed. The core problems lay elsewhere and what we dealt with were mere symptoms.

A few examples of symptoms are - (i) fast reducing number of IAF fighter squadrons (armed forces assets in general), (ii) inadequate contribution of indigenous industry, and (iii) lack of interest in young Indians towards joining the armed forces. The corresponding perceived solutions are - (i) exhort those concerned with acquisitions to expedite important cases, (ii) set up a committee to recommend actions to invigorate Defence R&D and industry, and (iii) send armed forces personnel to schools and universities to attract youngsters. The real causes behind the symptoms are not addressed; consequently, the symptoms resurface after some time.

Goldratt, in his Theory of Constraints, explains situations where one cause results into many undesirable effects or problems. He asks us to focus on it as a core constraint or problem. Further, he says that a core problem has usually been in the system for long. As such, many solutions addressing its symptoms would have already been tried unsuccessfully. Therefore, he suggests that we “re-examine the foundations of the system to invent simple solutions to create an environment where the problem simply cannot exist”

Goldratt’s problem cloud has prerequisites 1 and 2 in conflict with each other. Kelvyn Youngman further explains that Prerequisite 1 is ‘you have something which you don’t want', and Prerequisite 2 is ‘you don’t have but you want to have'.

This situation of living with something we don’t want and not getting something we want is the paralysis in status quo.

Decision makers are gripped by fear that a change may lead to a worse situation.

A combat force essentially needs a force mix where the life cycles (induction to disposal) of different fleets are staggered in time. It means that even with long fleet lives of the order of 30 to 40 years, acquisitions for replacements will need to be processed every 6 to 8 years. Include mid-life upgrades and systems integration needs, and the time period permissible for acquisitions would only be 4 to 5 years.

In contrast to the above requirements, our purchase processes have gone on for anything between 10 to 30 years from conception of staff requirements to orders placement. Account for contracts execution periods of at least 3 to 5 years (sometimes far more), and the huge gap between requirements and needs’ fulfillment begins to look horrifying.

Add to this, the uncertainties of indigenous developments leading to drastic elongation of timeframes and we are perennially in crisis.

Without any balance between life expiry and new acquisitions, how will it ever be possible for us to maintain desired force levels? No wonder that it has become a habit with us to extend lives of old unreliable aeroplanes and attempt adaptation of aeroplanes to unfamiliar roles.

“You have to visualize requirements for what you need 10 years hence”, seniors counsel the staff, never sure if even 10 years would be adequate. It is ridiculous that we have procedures to forecast even our spares requirement (even from established suppliers) 3 to 5 years in advance. Clearly, this approach is unsustainable in the fast moving world where agility is vital. We have to think differently and move to a new paradigm.

“You never change things by fighting the existing reality.
To change something, build a new model that makes the existing model obsolete.”

                                                                                                 --    R. Buckminster Fuller

Goldratt recommends a logical process of effect-cause-effect analysis to lead us to core constraints. However, without going into the details of Goldratt's method, I wish to use the aforementioned discussion to indicate the two core problems:-

§  Our acquisition process is extremely long and uncertain.

§  Projection of indigenous development timeframe is unrealistic.

The cloud representing the conflict in acquisition process can be drawn as shown. The core constraint is placed in block D. A few assumptions that need to be validated are shown alongside.

The indigenous development cloud can be drawn as shown. The core constraint is indication of unrealistic/ optimistic estimates for indigenous development. Once again the assumptions indicated alongside are only representative for understanding the deadlock.

The fundamentals laid out by Goldratt have to be kept in mind for a win-win solution in the national interest. First, all people are good, only assumptions are inappropriate. Second, there are no blames. Third, all complex problems have simple solutions. Fourth, people within the system have to invent a new solution; they cannot be asked to comply.

What you think is not important;

What your people think you think, that’s what really counts

-    E M Goldratt

Resting my faith in the firm commitment of today's leadership to bring all stakeholders together, I sincerely believe that India can, in the words of Goldratt, “create an environment where the problem cannot exist”.

                                             Air Marshal PV Athawale PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)