Evaporate Clouds for Defence Indigenisation

For continuity, please read my article on Rediff: 'I am God' won't Make in India

        The maxim “Machines do not make things, humans do” is reflected in the status of indigenous defence manufacturing in India. India’s dubious distinction as the top global importer for defence purchase is not due to lack of technology, but predominantly due to lack of commitment and synergy of human effort. Even so, the commitment from the government is most unequivocally visible today compared to the decades spent in rhetoric about promotion of Indian industry, especially the private sector.

While the commitment for action is strong, the progress will not be well directed unless we understand and resolve the conflict which paralyses us in the status-quo. Continual tinkering with  Defence Procurement Procedures (DPP) or  thicker rule books  look like solutions but result in little progress  when there is no change in the way we think about the deadlock.

The world we have created is a process of our thinking. It cannot be changed without changing our thinking

                                                                      -        Albert Einstein

           Air Force acquisitions are major contributors towards India’s standing among global arms importers. The examples and discussions hereon are, therefore, specific to the Air Force or military aviation requirements.

Dr. Eliyahu M. Goldratt put forward the ‘Theory of constraints’ and proposed a wonderful method of working towards resolution of conflicts that restrict achievement of the goal. He articulated that non achievement of goal in any system was due to a very small number of constraints (at least one constraint). These, called core constraints, have usually been in existence for long and intuitively well known. Many compromising solutions have possibly been implemented over and over again without success. A few of our examples of compromising virtual solutions are:-

§       Compel the Air Force to buy Indian and not foreign equipment.

§       Deny them technology, and they (DRDO and DPSUs) will make.

§     We cannot go to a single private company – let DRDO or DPSUs subcontract to private industry.

§      A fatter rule book; write more detailed Defence Procurement Procedures (DPP).

§ Air Force telling Indian industry “We support indigenisation; make excellent equipment and we will buy”.

Goldratt thought of the core problem as a dark black cloud and termed the method to a solution the Evaporating Clouds method. The need is to invent solutions where the problem won’t exist. To find solutions, he emphasized on ‘No Blames’!

When you blame others, you give up your power to change

-          Robert Anthony

He explained that a problem existed only if in satisfying two positive requirements leading to the objective, the corresponding prerequisites (or actions) were in conflict. The requirements are genuine. However, to meet corresponding requirements, different departments perceive prerequisites (actions) differently depending upon their local measures. The situation is depicted below. Conventionally the core problem is placed in block D. The answer is in D' but actions in D and D' are mutually exclusive:-

In the context of the deadlock between actions for indigenous defence manufacturing, the conflict can be represented as shown below. The core problem listed in block D is that we have to buy from foreign sources. The answer is in block D', i.e. buy Indian, but we can't - we are locked in conflict because state-of-the-art systems are not made in India:-

           

     The solution begins with identifying assumptions that 'cloud' our minds and then 'evaporating' the cloud by verbalising and invalidating some of our assumptions while  reinforcing others and then finding a solution that meets both the system requirements (B and C). Some of the system requirements may also have to be reviewed. The budget is limited - Our forces cannot possess all state-of-the-art platforms at any given time. IPL cricket is the best example, where a franchise has to maximize its firepower within the given budget following the norms laid down for acquiring foreign players. Similarly, it may be necessary to decide the minimum force level (acquisition) that can be indigenous, even if below par with globally top of the line; the follow up developments/upgrades must aspire to be state-of-the-art. The frontline needs, however, will have to be met with globally competitive platforms.

The answer lies in all parties coming together. Consequently, in the environment of trust that will develop, the Air Force may be assured that its acquisition needs for foreign purchase will not be jeopardized due to unrealistic timeframes of indigenous programmes. It will be better prepared to accept indigenous effort. The conflict cloud is as shown below. The core problem indicated in block D is that it has been projected for decades LCA would replace ageing fleets. Verbalising assumptions (some inappropriate and others valid) can indicate a solution to this dilemma. A few examples of assumptions that have been in existence for decades, are indicated below. Let us put ourselves in 1990, 2000 and also in 2010 to read assumptions.

         One more vital cloud needs to be dissipated – the fear of private industry. The core problem in D is that major contracts are awarded only to PSUs. Despite exciting discussions in seminars, nothing much has resulted about getting private industry’s participation in a level playing field. The cloud is shown below. The example of inappropriateness of one of the system’s requirements is explained alongside. Examination of other assumptions can follow.

   Indigenous design/development and defence manufacturing have unique challenges like a single user market and a single R&D agency i.e. the Govt. The industry, including the private sector, can grow only if the following measures are implemented:-

§      Until a 50% satisfaction level, the Armed Forces are put in the driver’s seat AND accordingly measured for indigenisation. The industry will race ahead after that.

§    The Defence R&D is well supported by the Armed Forces (partnership in vital projects) with measurable targets for achievement by both.

§    Defence PSUs are measured for performance predominantly by the amount of indigenous design/development and manufacture and NOT profits made through licensed manufacturing and support services.

§   Defence manufacturing is made more assured and profitable for the private industry.

 Today’s solution may not be relevant tomorrow. As the indigenous capability improves, a new force mix will have to be evolved and pursued. Strong indigenous industry exporting to friendly neighbours can further strengthen regional balance. It is the hope that whatever the relevant solutions in the changing tomorrows, below par indigenous weapon systems will never have to be bought by the Indian Armed Forces. Let us always remember that the end goal is not import or indeginisation but securing the country through able and ready armed forces.

                                    Air Marshal PV Athawale PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)