In Search of Solutions for IAF’s Dwindling Assets

Continuing where I left my previous post ‘Evaporating clouds for Defence Indigenisation’. . let me take up the problem of IAF’s dwindling combat assets. Strategic thinkers have been discussing and debating this issue for over two decades. Yet, there has not been any improvement in the situation because, despite good intentions,  actions by the establishment have not been well directed. The core problems lay elsewhere and what we dealt with were mere symptoms.

A few examples of symptoms are - (i) fast reducing number of IAF fighter squadrons (armed forces assets in general), (ii) inadequate contribution of indigenous industry, and (iii) lack of interest in young Indians towards joining the armed forces. The corresponding perceived solutions are - (i) exhort those concerned with acquisitions to expedite important cases, (ii) set up a committee to recommend actions to invigorate Defence R&D and industry, and (iii) send armed forces personnel to schools and universities to attract youngsters. The real causes behind the symptoms are not addressed; consequently, the symptoms resurface after some time.

Goldratt, in his Theory of Constraints, explains situations where one cause results into many undesirable effects or problems. He asks us to focus on it as a core constraint or problem. Further, he says that a core problem has usually been in the system for long. As such, many solutions addressing its symptoms would have already been tried unsuccessfully. Therefore, he suggests that we “re-examine the foundations of the system to invent simple solutions to create an environment where the problem simply cannot exist”

Goldratt’s problem cloud has prerequisites 1 and 2 in conflict with each other. Kelvyn Youngman further explains that Prerequisite 1 is ‘you have something which you don’t want', and Prerequisite 2 is ‘you don’t have but you want to have'.

This situation of living with something we don’t want and not getting something we want is the paralysis in status quo.

Decision makers are gripped by fear that a change may lead to a worse situation.

A combat force essentially needs a force mix where the life cycles (induction to disposal) of different fleets are staggered in time. It means that even with long fleet lives of the order of 30 to 40 years, acquisitions for replacements will need to be processed every 6 to 8 years. Include mid-life upgrades and systems integration needs, and the time period permissible for acquisitions would only be 4 to 5 years.

In contrast to the above requirements, our purchase processes have gone on for anything between 10 to 30 years from conception of staff requirements to orders placement. Account for contracts execution periods of at least 3 to 5 years (sometimes far more), and the huge gap between requirements and needs’ fulfillment begins to look horrifying.

Add to this, the uncertainties of indigenous developments leading to drastic elongation of timeframes and we are perennially in crisis.

Without any balance between life expiry and new acquisitions, how will it ever be possible for us to maintain desired force levels? No wonder that it has become a habit with us to extend lives of old unreliable aeroplanes and attempt adaptation of aeroplanes to unfamiliar roles.

“You have to visualize requirements for what you need 10 years hence”, seniors counsel the staff, never sure if even 10 years would be adequate. It is ridiculous that we have procedures to forecast even our spares requirement (even from established suppliers) 3 to 5 years in advance. Clearly, this approach is unsustainable in the fast moving world where agility is vital. We have to think differently and move to a new paradigm.

“You never change things by fighting the existing reality.
To change something, build a new model that makes the existing model obsolete.”

                                                                                                 --    R. Buckminster Fuller

Goldratt recommends a logical process of effect-cause-effect analysis to lead us to core constraints. However, without going into the details of Goldratt's method, I wish to use the aforementioned discussion to indicate the two core problems:-

§  Our acquisition process is extremely long and uncertain.

§  Projection of indigenous development timeframe is unrealistic.

The cloud representing the conflict in acquisition process can be drawn as shown. The core constraint is placed in block D. A few assumptions that need to be validated are shown alongside.

The indigenous development cloud can be drawn as shown. The core constraint is indication of unrealistic/ optimistic estimates for indigenous development. Once again the assumptions indicated alongside are only representative for understanding the deadlock.

The fundamentals laid out by Goldratt have to be kept in mind for a win-win solution in the national interest. First, all people are good, only assumptions are inappropriate. Second, there are no blames. Third, all complex problems have simple solutions. Fourth, people within the system have to invent a new solution; they cannot be asked to comply.

What you think is not important;

What your people think you think, that’s what really counts

-    E M Goldratt

Resting my faith in the firm commitment of today's leadership to bring all stakeholders together, I sincerely believe that India can, in the words of Goldratt, “create an environment where the problem cannot exist”.

                                             Air Marshal PV Athawale PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)

Evaporate Clouds for Defence Indigenisation

For continuity, please read my article on Rediff: 'I am God' won't Make in India

        The maxim “Machines do not make things, humans do” is reflected in the status of indigenous defence manufacturing in India. India’s dubious distinction as the top global importer for defence purchase is not due to lack of technology, but predominantly due to lack of commitment and synergy of human effort. Even so, the commitment from the government is most unequivocally visible today compared to the decades spent in rhetoric about promotion of Indian industry, especially the private sector.

While the commitment for action is strong, the progress will not be well directed unless we understand and resolve the conflict which paralyses us in the status-quo. Continual tinkering with  Defence Procurement Procedures (DPP) or  thicker rule books  look like solutions but result in little progress  when there is no change in the way we think about the deadlock.

The world we have created is a process of our thinking. It cannot be changed without changing our thinking

                                                                      -        Albert Einstein

           Air Force acquisitions are major contributors towards India’s standing among global arms importers. The examples and discussions hereon are, therefore, specific to the Air Force or military aviation requirements.

Dr. Eliyahu M. Goldratt put forward the ‘Theory of constraints’ and proposed a wonderful method of working towards resolution of conflicts that restrict achievement of the goal. He articulated that non achievement of goal in any system was due to a very small number of constraints (at least one constraint). These, called core constraints, have usually been in existence for long and intuitively well known. Many compromising solutions have possibly been implemented over and over again without success. A few of our examples of compromising virtual solutions are:-

§       Compel the Air Force to buy Indian and not foreign equipment.

§       Deny them technology, and they (DRDO and DPSUs) will make.

§     We cannot go to a single private company – let DRDO or DPSUs subcontract to private industry.

§      A fatter rule book; write more detailed Defence Procurement Procedures (DPP).

§ Air Force telling Indian industry “We support indigenisation; make excellent equipment and we will buy”.

Goldratt thought of the core problem as a dark black cloud and termed the method to a solution the Evaporating Clouds method. The need is to invent solutions where the problem won’t exist. To find solutions, he emphasized on ‘No Blames’!

When you blame others, you give up your power to change

-          Robert Anthony

He explained that a problem existed only if in satisfying two positive requirements leading to the objective, the corresponding prerequisites (or actions) were in conflict. The requirements are genuine. However, to meet corresponding requirements, different departments perceive prerequisites (actions) differently depending upon their local measures. The situation is depicted below. Conventionally the core problem is placed in block D. The answer is in D' but actions in D and D' are mutually exclusive:-

In the context of the deadlock between actions for indigenous defence manufacturing, the conflict can be represented as shown below. The core problem listed in block D is that we have to buy from foreign sources. The answer is in block D', i.e. buy Indian, but we can't - we are locked in conflict because state-of-the-art systems are not made in India:-

           

     The solution begins with identifying assumptions that 'cloud' our minds and then 'evaporating' the cloud by verbalising and invalidating some of our assumptions while  reinforcing others and then finding a solution that meets both the system requirements (B and C). Some of the system requirements may also have to be reviewed. The budget is limited - Our forces cannot possess all state-of-the-art platforms at any given time. IPL cricket is the best example, where a franchise has to maximize its firepower within the given budget following the norms laid down for acquiring foreign players. Similarly, it may be necessary to decide the minimum force level (acquisition) that can be indigenous, even if below par with globally top of the line; the follow up developments/upgrades must aspire to be state-of-the-art. The frontline needs, however, will have to be met with globally competitive platforms.

The answer lies in all parties coming together. Consequently, in the environment of trust that will develop, the Air Force may be assured that its acquisition needs for foreign purchase will not be jeopardized due to unrealistic timeframes of indigenous programmes. It will be better prepared to accept indigenous effort. The conflict cloud is as shown below. The core problem indicated in block D is that it has been projected for decades LCA would replace ageing fleets. Verbalising assumptions (some inappropriate and others valid) can indicate a solution to this dilemma. A few examples of assumptions that have been in existence for decades, are indicated below. Let us put ourselves in 1990, 2000 and also in 2010 to read assumptions.

         One more vital cloud needs to be dissipated – the fear of private industry. The core problem in D is that major contracts are awarded only to PSUs. Despite exciting discussions in seminars, nothing much has resulted about getting private industry’s participation in a level playing field. The cloud is shown below. The example of inappropriateness of one of the system’s requirements is explained alongside. Examination of other assumptions can follow.

   Indigenous design/development and defence manufacturing have unique challenges like a single user market and a single R&D agency i.e. the Govt. The industry, including the private sector, can grow only if the following measures are implemented:-

§      Until a 50% satisfaction level, the Armed Forces are put in the driver’s seat AND accordingly measured for indigenisation. The industry will race ahead after that.

§    The Defence R&D is well supported by the Armed Forces (partnership in vital projects) with measurable targets for achievement by both.

§    Defence PSUs are measured for performance predominantly by the amount of indigenous design/development and manufacture and NOT profits made through licensed manufacturing and support services.

§   Defence manufacturing is made more assured and profitable for the private industry.

 Today’s solution may not be relevant tomorrow. As the indigenous capability improves, a new force mix will have to be evolved and pursued. Strong indigenous industry exporting to friendly neighbours can further strengthen regional balance. It is the hope that whatever the relevant solutions in the changing tomorrows, below par indigenous weapon systems will never have to be bought by the Indian Armed Forces. Let us always remember that the end goal is not import or indeginisation but securing the country through able and ready armed forces.

                                    Air Marshal PV Athawale PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)

Indian Air Force Amidst 'Many Gods' -
Will we Make in India?

My article published on Rediff on 13 Apr 2016 
'I am God‘ Won’t Make in India
http://www.rediff.com/news/column/make-in-india-cant-be-forced-upon-the-military/20160413.htm

Years ago, a Swamiji was invited by the College of Defence Management as a part of a series of guest lectures. What stayed with me was his analogy for human behaviour. He spoke about the two distinctive human behavioural patterns – the ‘dog pattern’ and the ‘cat pattern’. A dog and a cat lived in each other’s neighbourhood. Both were happy in their respective lives. The dog said “I am happy; my master looks after me very well – he is God”. The cat was different. He said “I am happy; my master looks after me very well because I am God”.

Ever since, I have looked at different situations of conflict with Swamji’s wisdom. Everything falls into place once we appreciate the patterns of human behaviour where some people or organisations expect others to submit to them. I call it the ‘I am God’ syndrome.

When interacting elements begin to believe that ‘I am God’, despite each one meaning well, the result is a lack of synergy and non-accomplishment. This is what happens between the players that aspire to build indigenous capability for the Indian Armed Forces .

People often cite the development of space capability and the accomplishments in atomic energy and exclaim “If they can, why not the Defence!” They overlook the unity of direction in those domains - the designer, developer, user and maintainer being under the control of a single agency.

The military capability of a nation rests on a triangular base. The three pillars are     (i) Armed Forces on the basis of assets and training/ preparation, (ii) Research & Development capability, and (iii) Manufacturing/Industrial capacity. The military could also be classified into three distinct classes on the basis of its influence, (i) Local, (ii) Regional and (iii) Global. However proficient, a fighting force be, its reach will be localised if the nation’s R&D and industrial capability are insignificant. For a nation to aspire to enhance its military influence to the regional level, it has to progressively improve its industrial capability. Finally, any military can have Global influence only if the nation’s R&D and industry are dominant players with a cutting edge over adversaries. This gives its military the first use of best weapon systems to develop operational concepts and tactics ahead of other nations.

Let us remember that ‘Make in India for Defence' must not be our goal. The goal is to have a strong military to help the nation protect its identity and assert its will. Enhanced indigenous industrial capability is a prerequisite for the nation’s military to be reliable and effective in times of crisis. Therefore, indigenous design/development and manufacturing capability are necessary conditions for achieving the goal of maintaining a powerful military force. This simply means that 'Made in India' cannot be forced upon the military without ensuring that it meets the requirements. In a recent panel discussion on the subject at IIT Roorkee, the Raksha Mantri pointed out the prerequisite by saying that “the needs of the armed forces cannot be overlooked”.

Each of the three pillars or components of military capability (Armed Forces, R&D, and Industrial Capacity) is often measured for performance in isolation. Consequently, each one strives to maximise its performance in seclusion. It is convenient to work independently towards a localised objective. The industry (mainly Defence PSUs) have made profits through licensed manufacturing, while progressively reducing the design & development effort – the local measures of production and profits have been well satisfied. The DRDO, satisfied in accomplishing programmes which permit autonomy in execution, have given little of significance to military aviation’s requirements. Both DRDO and Defence PSUs view the Armed Forces’ penchant for foreign systems as a problem. The Armed Forces, who carry the ultimate responsibility, justify foreign purchases because of the lack of availability of indigenously developed state-of-the-art weapon systems.

Strategic thinkers often wonder why we cannot produce indigenous designs today, when we (HAL) had produced an indigenously designed and developed multi role fighter aircraft (HF-24 Marut) in the early sixties.

Back then, DRDO hadn’t quite grown and HAL top management was deputed from the Air Force. These situations are not relevant to the size of these organisations and the expected performance from defence R & D and industry today. The fact is that the unified direction and control of those times was vital in creating HF-24 Marut.

Both DRDO and HAL are now big empires; Gods in their own right, who desire submission by their clients and acceptance of their products as a mark of appreciation for their hard work. It is not uncommon to hear expressions like “The Air Force would keep asking for more, but, had to be directed to accept!”

On its part, the Air Force is not happy to compromise specs - There is a limit to which the genius of our pilots can offset our aircraft deficiencies compared to adversaries. When the old specs are nearly met a decade later, the world has moved on and those specs now fall short of the Air Force’s current expectations. And the process goes on. . As a solution, the Air Force looks for more control and makes futile attempts to make the impossible happen - have an Air Force pilot as the Chairman HAL!

Every player in the arena has noble intentions towards making the nation stronger. However, each one’s perception of the requirements is different. These perceptions differ because they are based on inappropriate assumptions to satisfy local measures. The result is that we have three Gods to be brought together (in addition to the much needed private industry).

The solution is in ‘win-win’ – no one should be forced into compromises. The industry shouldn’t be made to wait endlessly for products to be put to use. There is no short cut to development of hi-tech systems. Our own armed forces have to use indigenous systems at intermediate stages of technological development for products to mature and be counted among the best in the world. At the same time, the armed forces need for state-of-the-art should be acknowledged before jeopardising acquisitions in view of unrealistic assurances of indigenous development timeframes.

The ‘I am God’ syndrome won’t permit us to make in India until all agencies come together to find this win-win solution. The Raksha Mantri may consider appointment of a coordination group consisting those with techno-military acumen to facilitate synergy and advise him directly without the bureaucracy stepping in as another Super God.

                                  Air Marshal PV Athawale PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)

                                  Former AOC-in-C of Maintenance Command, IAF

Ex-Servicemen Are Special:

Worthy Agents for Make in India

My article published on Rediff on 18 Mar 2016
http://www.rediff.com/business/column/make-in-india-needs-ex-servicemen/20160318.htm

During interaction with MBA students at an IIT, I asked “Do you know any national industry bigger than the Indian Air Force?” I expected someone would name the Indian Railways - there was only inquisitive silence. So I continued “I know one, and that is the Indian Army. However, when you consider sophistication and size, there are few that match the Indian Air Force. But, you don’t consider military an industry because we don’t make money! Most management philosophies have originated from the military. You may not wish to join the Armed Forces, but inclusion of pioneering military logistics & supply chain management philosophies will enrich your studies and research”.

Countrymen naturally see the Armed Forces as Combat Forces comprising infantry/ artillery/ warships/ submarines/ fighter planes. We fail to see the huge industrial world behind icons like infantrymen, submariners and fighter pilots. Without adequate industrial capability to balance, the Indian Army would be something like a paramilitary outfit while the Indian Air Force would be akin to Indigo Airlines, which depends on Sri Lankan facility for routine aircraft servicing.

Army Base Workshops, Naval Dockyards and Air Force Base Repair Depots, carryout hi-tech work of Maintenance/ Repair/ Overhauls (MRO). Besides Depot Maintenance, especially on Air Force bases, Naval ships and special Army units, engineers handle technology superior to most industrial houses. Army engineers specialize in specific streams like operational aspects of Engineering and Signals (communications and IT) or maintenance support to Electrical & Mechanical systems of the Army. Engineers in the Navy specialize in Marine Engineering, Electrical systems or Aviation Engineering. Each one is among the best in their respective disciplines. Air Force engineers from the Aeronautical Engineering branch have a purview covering a range of systems wider than any other contemporary industry. Fighter/ transport aircraft, helicopters, missiles, radars, communication, IT, Electronic Warfare systems, real time avionics software and flight testing & certification make a huge scope of responsibilities. One engineer excelling in at least three or more fields is a common occurrence.

Questions are often raised about the quality of engineering graduates joining the Armed Forces. Let me not delve into the reasons, some of which are evident and well known to the national leadership. Let us look at whether engineers in Armed Forces measure up to the assigned tasks. The answer is an emphatic ‘yes’. A sizeable number of Armed Forces Engineers regularly undertake Post Graduate studies at IITs. Many come out in the top 10%, a few literally topping the list with a flawless CGPA of 10. Armed Forces engineering institutions groom the incoming engineers at par with the best elsewhere. These engineers should therefore be known by invaluable tags representing their respective Army, Navy and Air Force institutions.

Everyone in the private sector does not reach the Vice President or CEO level. But, one does not face embarrassment in being visibly compared with those running ahead in the race. In civil public sector, the journey is assured to the Joint Secretary level while perks and privileges remain attractive at all levels.

In contrast, the command & control needs of combat forces require them to have pyramid like structures. They have steep promotion ratios for engineers aspiring to be Colonels and equivalent. The adage goes to say that tens not making it are not inferior to the one who performed better under the circumstances. Most superseded officers find it embarrassing to continue as ranks displayed on shoulders play a significant part in fauji life. Even if they do wish, they can continue only as far as the rank permits - after all, we can’t have Generals commanding armies having Colonels originally senior to them.

Not all Colonel/ Captain/ Group Captain level officers leaving service are superseded. A significant number applies for relief on compassionate grounds on account of family problems and commitments that cannot be met while being in the highly demanding service life.

The fact is that a huge number of highly qualified/ experienced engineers, and above all extraordinary professionals, regularly come out of the armed forces. The industry hugely unaware of this potential is unable to tap this resource. Most industries often measure Ex-service officers with their potential to add to order book entries. Instead, companies need to employ Ex-service officers to blend seamlessly within their organizations.

The Armed Forces industry is not about officers or graduate engineers alone. The backbone, its technicians are a brand of their own rarely matched by anyone outside. I have worked with Air Force technicians for nearly four decades. I have no doubts that they are among the best in the country, if not the world. Unfortunately, many prospective employers see only security management roles for Ex-servicemen employment.

Here is a huge opportunity for the private sector industry in general, and one especially dealing with or initiating into the Defence domain.

The Defence R & D and manufacturing industry comprising DRDO, DGQA/ DGAQA and DPSUs has huge empires somewhat isolated from the Armed Forces. They have their own gaps in understanding the whole process of design & development to field trials & induction. Ex-servicemen retiring early can be an asset and should be absorbed. 

Subroto Bagchi in his book ‘The Professional’ distinguishes a true professional from the one only professionally skilled. These Ex-servicemen engineers and technicians are true professionals worthy of being ‘Make in India’ agents. They can be trusted to bring long term dividends – it is in their character to be long term loyalists!

                                                       

                                                      Air Marshal PV Athawale PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)

                                                      Alumnus of IIT Roorkee and IIT Kharagpur
                                                      Former AOC-in-Chief of Maintenance Command, IAF

Women’s role vital in non-commissioned ranks of IAF 
Beyond fighter pilot glamour

My article published on Rediff on 27 Oct 2015

http://www.rediff.com/news/column/beyond-the-fighter-pilot-glamour/20151027.htm

On the occasion of the 83^rd anniversary of the Indian Air Force, the Air Chief announced the intended induction of women fighter pilots in the near future. He was addressing serving personnel and veterans.  Amidst cheers and applause, most would have expected traditional bureaucratic delay. News of Govt approval within two weeks of the Air Force Day on
8^th October 2015 has, therefore, come as a pleasant surprise.

          One may believe that the transformation of IAF to include women would be complete after putting the first woman fighter pilot in the cockpit in June 2017. Would it really be so? Is getting women as officers and fighter pilots the end state of women’s equality and opportunities? Why have we focused mainly on the question of women becoming fighter pilots? Why have women never asked for induction as Airwomen (technician and clerks, who also do armed guard duties), Security Guards or Enrolled Non-Combatants? Is it that these jobs at lower levels demand far greater hardships without being glamorous?

          Sri Lanka and India were decades ahead of the western world in getting women elected as their respective heads of governments. Does that in any way indicate that our women were more empowered than the rest? Empowerment of any section of society does not happen by a few top level appointments. Top level appointments primarily serve the concerned individuals’ ascent. Instead, the engagement of larger sections at the base gets them genuine representation and respect.

During a debate on NDTV a few years ago, there was an onslaught by one and all on a former Vice Chief of IAF. The debaters and the audience were both emotionally charged about the denial of fighter pilot opportunities to women. Ever since, I have been wondering why no one ever raised a question of non-employment of women in the ranks below officers’ level. The Indian woman wants to first become a fighter pilot – good. However, it would be an exaggeration to project it as a national cause for women’s empowerment. Women joining at ranks below officers’ level will create tens of thousands of job opportunities besides truly changing the Air Force beyond face value.

Apart from officers, including fighter pilots, the Air Force is predominantly made up of the larger base of air warriors below officers’ rank. The first lot of UK trained pilots was commissioned and the Gazette notification for establishment of IAF issued on 8^th October 1932. However, IAF started functioning in the real sense only after the Hawai Sepoys joined on formation of its first squadron, the No. 1 Squadron

With the government approval for fighter pilots, a major win for the cause of women’s prestige and pride has been achieved. We should now shift the focus away from accompanied glamour to the realities of life affecting women’s participation. The Armed Forces now need to move towards attaining cohesive inclusion of women across their ranks.

We have reason to informally believe that the IAF is thinking about taking on the challenges of employing women in the rank and file of its organization. As part of a group on a short visit to Israel years ago, I recall facing a young woman dressed in battle fatigues and armed with a machine gun checking us for security at the entrance of a military station. Let us trust our Air Force that such a scenario will be a reality in India, not too far into the future.

                    Air Mshl PV Athawale PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)

                          Former AOC_in-C Maintenance Command IAF