In Search of Simple Solutions

Make in India for Defence

“The more complicated the situation seems to be, the simpler the solution must be”
-          Eliyahu M. Goldratt

The situation seems to be that the Indian Air Force is woefully short of squadron strength, slipping further with each passing day. The other weapon systems on ground don’t catch as much public attention – I reckon that the situation won’t be quite different. The Army and Navy would have their own, not dissimilar, challenges. The parable of the ‘Boiling Frog’ reminds us that a frog in water that is brought to boil gradually will be cooked to death because it will not perceive the gradual escalation of danger in its circumstances. The problem of inadequacy has existed for so long that we all have become used to it. With this unknowing acceptance, we risk dangerous consequences.

Individuals or groups of people often have their own perceived solutions or compromises to long standing predicaments. “It has always been like this, and because of someone else” has been a convenient getaway for each one of the players involved. It has provided much relief from the guilt of being a part of systemic non-performance. The blind hope is that ‘the armed forces will somehow, magically perform when called upon to do so’. The saving grace then, will be that this is not called to test in unfavourable circumstances.

The Centre for Economic Policy Research, in association with Defence And Security Alert and Swadeshi Jagaran Manch, recently organized a discussion on the theme of ‘India Reboot: Arming Indian Defence’. The event was remarkable in the nature of discussions that veered off the beaten track. Instead of the traditional format where few speak and most listen, here a few triggered the thinking and most others present participated and articulated their opinions. This informal approach facilitated brainstorming of ideas without pressing the discussants to provide answers. Journalists, former bureaucrats and veteran soldiers all presented their assessments of the situation. The flip side was that many focused on a telling and retelling of their problems instead of brainstorming around solutions. Nevertheless, even accepting the problem is getting halfway home to a solution!

In this article, I elaborate on my assessment of why we are where we are and the possible way ahead,

Assertions

A few assertions are necessary before delving into the causes and solutions.

We often mistake symptoms for problems and try to find quick fix solutions. Just one example; fast reducing number of Air Force fighter squadrons is not the problem. It is a symptom (or an effect) of a root cause, which lies somewhere else. Acquisition processes that go on from conception of staff requirements to orders placement for anything between 10 to 30 years are clearly the problem area, which we take as GIVEN and try to work around. “You have to visualise requirements for what you need 10 years hence”, seniors counsel the staff, never sure if even 10 years would be adequate. How can we then ever bridge the numbers gap?

Goldratt, in his Theory of Constraints, says “All people are good, our assumptions are bad”. My assertion in line with Goldratt’s theory is that all involved are sincere in efforts with honest intentions – only that we don’t synergise.

I believe that ‘Make in India’ has not been possible for the last 40 years, not because of the lack of technology. Or else, we would not have been in space with such an acclaim. Make in India has not been possible simply because of the lack of human synergism.

Various agencies, despite honourable intentions, work towards local optima. This results in conflicts between different parts of the system constraining systemic improvement.

The Causes: Why?

First of all we need to acknowledge that ‘Make in India for Defence’ is not our goal. The GOAL is to have strong military that will enable the nation assert its will. If it weren’t so, we would force our armed forces to use only made in India equipment. Shortly thereafter, we wouldn't survive to be able to fight another war with made in India. ‘Make in India’, however, is one of the most vital components leading to a strong military.

The dilemma is that armed forces need state-of-the-art weapon systems to fight wars. And, state-of-the-art weapon systems are not made in India; therefore, we have to buy foreign. On the other hand, the armed forces would remain dependent unless we have indigenous capability; for which we have to buy Indian. Towards a common goal, buy foreign and buy Indian are the two actions in conflict with each other.

The conflict remains unresolved because of the one core issue that the cost and time estimates for indigenous developments are projected unrealistically. This may be so for the reasons of getting indigenous projects approved. However, the armed forces find their foreign acquisitions jeopardised because of such indigenous claims. “LCA is coming” has been an ongoing claim, which had questioned even the SU-30 acquisition decades ago. Let that not take away from our R&D and manufacturing agencies the credit for having done a wonderful job. But, in the environment of trust with realistic projections of LCA developments, Air Force would have been compelled to participate in the programme wholeheartedly with dramatically different results. The Air Force would then be able to accept and begin to use below par outcome with an assurance of progressive upgrade. Everyone knows that the design and development agencies cannot produce best in the world indigenously in one step.

One major cause of lack of human synergy is the ‘I am God’ syndrome. Compared to the HF-24 days, both DRDO and HAL are now big empires; Gods in their own right; Air Force is another God that claims its rights because of having the final responsibility. The participants’ discussions also brought out that in terms of security operations, many more Gods who can talk war have now appeared on the scene. Every player in the arena has noble intentions towards making the nation stronger. However, each one’s perception of the requirements is localised and different. Getting many Gods to come together is the major challenge.

The private industry has not been able to enter the arena despite the lip service promoting public-private partnership. High cost especially in aviation and single customer reality in military deals are issues, which bring in tremendous challenges to the private industry. Modifications to Defence Procurement Procedures have not been enough to surge the private industry in. There is much more to be done by the Govt and the armed forces to see how to help the private industry to eventually help us indigenise.

The Way Ahead

A few recommendations:-

§  First and foremost, we have to set up an environment of no-blame.

§  It may sound illogical (what do forces know about design, development and manufacture) but, it is essential to assign indigenisation responsibility to armed forces (authority to call shots and not blame) till we achieve a 50% satisfaction level. After that the R&D and manufacturing industry will race ahead to give us the best anyway.

§  With themselves in the driving seats, the armed forces should plan a force mix that can accommodate some indigenous equipment, which is a shade below state-of-the-art. Acceptance of such systems with minor shortfalls but assurance for further development will go a long way in building indigenous capability.

§  A coordination group of professionals with techno-military acumen should be set up to bring together many Gods. Most importantly this group should report directly to the Raksha Mantri. However, this group should only be a facilitation group to smoothen the rough edges in relationships with no authority to dictate lest it becomes a super God.

§  Acquisition processes have to be considered as time bound projects and measured as time to go at all stages through the process.

§  There cannot be any ‘Make in India’ without the private sector. While we continue promotion of the private industry through improvements in DPP, the first thing that can facilitate is their entry into MRO (Maintenance Repair Overhaul). For that, instead of looking at armed forces workshops, the MRO undertaken by DPSUs should be gradually shifted to the private industry with DPSUs support and mentoring. The DPSUs would then be relieved to focus on design/development.

§  Finally, let us not look at our weaknesses alone. The nation’s strength in software has not been harnessed adequately for the military needs. The world runs on software and the outcome of future wars would most certainly be determined by adversaries’ software capabilities. Let ‘Make in India’ focus also largely on software for real-time operational systems and space and cyber domains.

Goldratt's timeless insight cannot be re-iterated enough.                                                   “The more complicated the situation seems to be, the simpler the solution must be”

The excerpts of this have been published in Defence And Security Alert April 2017 volume